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 Something good and something bad happened recently in govern-
ment and judicial ethics; for some reason, no one has truly noticed 
yet.  The Supreme Court all but banned First Amendment analysis 
as applied to recusal laws, both legislative and judicial.  That, ac-
tually, is the good thing, or so this Article argues.  The bad thing is 
that the Court, in doing so, used a geriatric approach to constitu-
tional theory.  The approach is unduly reverent of anything “old;” 
and old is not limited to the practices of the Founding Fathers but 
also includes “traditional” practices within some undefined range.  
But what is old is not necessarily wise, and a theory to the contrary 
leads to degenerative results in general and in ethics in particular, 
or so this Article argues further.  This Article concludes with a re-
turn to the positive, hoping that the Court’s path may have inad-
vertently sparked a viable conceptual foundation for judicial recusal 
law and practice, which of course, have received much general press 
and scholarly attention of late.  That path is reconceptualizing the 
nature of judicial action away from the judge as an individual and 
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INTRODUCTION 
A decade ago, the Supreme Court opened a can of worms in the 
field of judicial ethics regulation.  Some of the Justices did so inten-
tionally,1 other Justices did so mistakenly,2 and other Justices resisted 
futilely.3  Whatever the intent, these worms have since been burrow-
ing sizeable holes in the canons of judicial ethics.   
The case was Republican Party of Minnesota v. White,4 and the can 
of worms was, perhaps surprisingly, the First Amendment.  Although 
 
 1. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 776, 788 (2002) (striking 
down a Minnesota rule of judicial ethics barring judicial candidates from “announcing 
their views on disputed legal or political issues” because the rule was not narrowly tailored 
and therefore failed First Amendment strict scrutiny analysis); see also Republican Party of 
Minn. v. White, 416 F.3d 738, 766 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (striking down a rule of judi-
cial ethics prohibiting judicial candidates from announcing their party affiliation).   
 2. Retired Justice Sandra Day O’Connor has since repudiated her vote in White (to no 
legal effect, of course).  See Matthew Hirsch, Swing Voter’s Lament: At Least One Case Still Bugs 
O’Connor, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Nov. 9, 2006, at 2 (quoting Justice O’Connor stating that 
the “White case, I confess, does give me pause”). 
 3. See White, 536 U.S. at 797, 817 (Stevens & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting) (arguing that 
the majority opinion, which ignored the importance of judicial impartiality, would have 
far-reaching effects).  
 4. 536 U.S. 765 (2002). 
  
2012] RECUSAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 221 
the judicial ethics codes have been around for eighty-plus years,5 they 
have never enjoyed a comfortable working relationship with the First 
Amendment.  Indeed, whole canons are aimed—purposely—at sup-
pressing judges’ speech and expressive conduct, and other canons are 
aimed—again purposely—at forcing judges to recuse themselves from 
certain cases on the basis of their speech and expressive conduct.6  
Although the tension between the canons and the First Amendment 
has always been palpable, the canons—and more importantly, the ju-
dicial regulators charged with enforcing them—suffered very few First 
Amendment losses until a decade ago.7 
White caused, or at least portended, a wave of constitutional liti-
gation in both federal and state courts.  To judicial ethics regulators 
(and me)8 that wave was scary and chilling, and in some ways, it still 
 
 5. See Eileen C. Gallagher, The ABA Revisits the Model Code of Judicial Conduct: A Report 
on Progress, 44 JUDGES J. 7, 7 (2005) (noting that the ABA’s Canons of Judicial Ethics were 
first adopted in 1924). 
 6. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2, R. 2.10(A) (2007) (barring 
judges from commenting on pending proceedings); MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 
Canon 3B(9) (2004) (same); MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1 (2007) (bar-
ring even the “appearance of impropriety”); MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 
2A (2004) (same); MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 4, R. 4.1 (2007) (barring 
various interactions and affiliations with political organizations); MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL 
CONDUCT Canon 5A(1) (2004) (same); MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2, R. 
2.11(A)(5) (2007) (requiring recusal when “[t]he judge . . . has made a public statement, 
other than in a court proceeding, judicial decision, or opinion, that commits or appears to 
commit the judge to reach a particular result or rule in a particular way in the proceeding 
or controversy”); MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3E(1)(f) (2004) (requiring 
recusal whenever “the judge, while a judge or a candidate for judicial office, has made a 
public statement that commits, or appears to commit, the judge with respect to (i) an issue 
in the proceeding; or (ii) the controversy in the proceeding”).  
 7. To be sure, the prominent Judge Posner struck a significant First Amendment blow 
about a decade earlier.  See Buckley v. Ill. Judicial Inquiry Bd., 997 F.2d 224, 228, 231 (7th 
Cir. 1993) (striking down the “announce clause”).  As Judge Posner necessarily conceded, 
however, his only on-point authority was a Kentucky Supreme Court decision from two 
years earlier, J.C.J.D. v. R.J.C.R., 803 S.W.2d 953 (Ky. 1991), and as he further conceded, 
the Third Circuit had reached the opposite conclusion that same year in Stretton v. Discipli-
nary Board, 944 F.2d 137 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 8. By way of background, the United States now has a generally strong system of judi-
cial ethics regulation, in which judicial conduct commissions and state supreme courts 
routinely discipline (for example, censure, suspend, or remove) judges for conduct that 
violates the canons of judicial ethics.  See Keith Swisher, The Judicial Ethics of Criminal Law 
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is.9  While weighing countervailing First Amendment interests, White 
seemingly underweighs the ideal role of the judge in the American 
system,10 and it is symptomatic of judicial elections, which are prob-
lematic for reasons beyond this Essay’s scope.  But two very recent Su-
preme Court cases have protected, and even exalted, the judicial eth-
ics rules and statutes governing recusal.11  As I argue in Parts I 
through III, the end result is that White, when coupled with two very 
recent cases in an unlikely trilogy, has ultimately and perhaps inad-
vertently brought a greater good to ethics in government: Recusal 
laws are now clearly constitutional and enforceable.  This result 
should promote (among other good things) judicial impartiality and 
integrity, which in turn protect litigants, the rule of law, and public 
confidence in the judiciary.  
But with good often comes bad: The Court’s reasoning—namely, 
that age and tradition should play the primary roles in assessing the 
permissibility of conduct—leads to arbitrary constitutional and ethical 
theory, if it can be called theory at all.  It is, in short, a blind reverence 
to anything old, which is concerning for any primary theory of inter-
pretation, but it is particularly concerning for ethics, as raised in Part 
IV.  Moreover, the Court’s approach is further diminished by a lack of 
rigor in its historiography.12  I end, however, on a positive upshot of 
the Court’s historical approach: By taking away judges’ ownership and 
standing over their judicial votes, the Court’s reasoning has suggested 
 
Adjudication, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 755, 756–65 (2009) (discussing judicial conduct commissions, 
the judicial ethics codes, and their significant influence in regulating judicial conduct). 
 9. See infra note 119 (noting the risk that future litigation might raise vagueness, 
overbreadth, and associational rights challenges to the judicial ethics rules).   
 10. See, e.g., Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 803–04 (2002) (Gins-
burg, J., dissenting) (“Unlike their counterparts in the political branches, judges are ex-
pected to refrain from catering to particular constituencies or committing themselves on 
controversial issues in advance of adversarial presentation.  Their mission is to decide ‘in-
dividual cases and controversies’ on individual records, neutrally applying legal principles, 
and, when necessary, ‘stand[ing] up to what is generally supreme in a democracy: the 
popular will.’” (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Antonin Scalia, The 
Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1180 (1989))); see also id. at 813 
(“This judicial obligation to avoid prejudgment corresponds to the litigant’s right, pro-
tected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, to ‘an impartial and dis-
interested tribunal in both civil and criminal cases.’” (quoting Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 
U.S. 238, 242 (1980))). 
 11. See infra Parts II–III. 
 12. See infra Part IV.A. 
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a new conceptual foundation for judicial recusal, which badly needs 
the boost of late.13 
I.  CONUNDRUM: REPUBLICAN PARTY OF MINNESOTA V. WHITE 
The modern story of the regulation of judges’ ethics in this coun-
try has much to do with a trilogy of cases.  The first case in that trilogy 
prominently pitted the First Amendment against judicial ethics, and 
when the Supreme Court declared the First Amendment to be the 
winner,14 the judicial ethics regulations and regulators were cast into 
doubt for a decade.15 
A candidate for the Minnesota Supreme Court, Greg Wersal, 
wanted to campaign on what has become a typical conservative plat-
form in judicial elections.  In particular, he desired to criticize the 
court publicly for its rulings on “crime, welfare, and abortion.”16  As a 
 
 13. See infra Part IV.B (describing the conceptual shift toward “judges as trustees”).  
Judicial ethics and particularly recusal have received much press of late, focusing on the 
Supreme Court’s lack of a binding judicial ethics code, which embarrassingly distinguishes 
it from virtually every other federal and state court in the country, and its questionable 
recusal decisions.  See, e.g., Editorial, The Supreme Court’s Recusal Problem, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 
2011, at A38.  The buzz has been so loud that Chief Justice Roberts devoted his entire an-
nual report to the matter.  See CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN ROBERTS, 2011 YEAR-END REPORT ON 
THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2011), http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-
end/2011year-endreport.pdf (commenting on the call for and development of the ABA’s 
first judicial ethics code); Adam Liptak, Chief Justice Defends Peers on Health Law, N.Y. TIMES,  
Jan. 1, 2012, at A1 (relating the Chief Justice’s comments in his report to the debate on 
whether Justices Thomas and Kagan should recuse themselves from the healthcare case).  
In as many months, Chief Justice Roberts has twice rejected calls for reform.  See Robert 
Barnes, Roberts: Justices Won’t Adopt Code of Conduct, WASH. POST, Feb. 22, 2012, at A7 (citing 
Chief Justice Roberts’s recent letter to senators, including the Chair of the Judiciary 
Committee, in which the Chief Justice rejected their requests for the Court to adopt a 
binding judicial ethics code).    
 14. White, 536 U.S. at 788. 
 15. See supra note 6 (providing a significant sampling of the various provisions of judi-
cial ethics implicating the First Amendment); see also supra note 8 (noting the widespread 
and well-rooted system of judicial ethics regulation in this country). 
 16. White, 536 U.S. at 768.  The political (attitudinal) read of the case is that the Re-
publican Justices invalidated a rule that blocked a Republican judicial candidate from an-
nouncing his conservative views during the judicial election.  For this and other reasons, 
judicial elections tend to be, on balance, more problematic than merit selection, but a di-
rect attack on judicial elections is beyond this work’s scope.  For more on the advantages 
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candidate for judicial office, however, the canons of judicial ethics in 
Minnesota (and in several other states at the time) prohibited him 
from doing so.17  In particular, the rules barred candidates (and in-
cumbents) from announcing their views on “disputed legal and polit-
ical issues.”18  Fearing that he might be silenced or disciplined, or 
both, Wersal brought suit claiming that this “announce clause” violat-
ed the First Amendment.19   
Applying demanding strict scrutiny analysis, the Court concluded 
that the canon violated the First Amendment.20  Although Justice 
O’Connor has since renounced her vote in the case,21 at the time she 
perhaps framed the problem best: She acknowledged that “[e]lected 
judges cannot help being aware that if the public is not satisfied with 
the outcome of a particular case, it could hurt their reelection pro-
spects” and their “rel[iance] on campaign donations may leave judges 
feeling indebted to certain parties or interest groups.”22  But, having 
 
of the merit system, see Mark I. Harrison et al., On the Validity and Vitality of Arizona’s Judi-
cial Merit Selection System: Past, Present, and Future, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 239, 239, 250–59 
(2007). 
 17. White, 536 U.S. at 770; see also J.J. GASS, AFTER WHITE: DEFENDING AND AMENDING 
CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS 2 (2004) (noting that eight states had some version of the 
challenged “announce clause” when White was decided). 
 18. White, 536 U.S. at 768.   
 19. I have spared the reader White’s disorderly procedural posture.  See id. at 768–70 
(reviewing the procedural history of the case).  
 20. Id. at 774–75, 788; see also James Bopp, Jr. & Anita Y. Woudenberg, To Speak or Not to 
Speak: Unconstitutional Regulation in the Wake of White, 28 JUST. SYS. J. 329, 330 (2007) (“In 
particular, the Court, interpreting ‘impartiality’ to prevent ‘bias for or against parties’ and 
possibly to preserve the ‘openmindedness’ of a judge, found that preventing judicial can-
didates from merely announcing their views on various legal, political, and social issues did 
not address those concerns at all and, consequently, could not justify the restriction of an 
express constitutional right to free speech.”). 
 21. See Hirsch, supra note 2, at 2 (revealing that Justice O’Connor has since reconsid-
ered her vote in White). 
 22. White, 536 U.S. at 789–790 (O’Connor, J., concurring); see also id. at 816 (Ginsburg, 
J., dissenting) (concluding that an elected judge has a “direct, personal, substantial, [and] 
pecuniary interest in ruling against certain litigants for she may be voted off the bench and 
thereby lose her salary and emoluments unless she honors the pledge that secured her 
election.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); 
MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS § 9.08[3], at 
248–50 (3d ed. 2004) (noting the important fact that Justices Ginsburg and O’Connor 
were writing for five justices). 
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chosen that questionable system, the state could not duct-tape judges’ 
mouths on the campaign trail: 
Minnesota has chosen to select its judges through contested 
popular elections instead of through an appointment system 
or a combined appointment and retention election system 
along the lines of the Missouri Plan.  In doing so the State 
has voluntarily taken on the risks to judicial bias . . . .  As a 
result, the State’s claim that it needs to significantly restrict 
judges’ speech in order to protect judicial impartiality is par-
ticularly troubling.  If the State has a problem with judicial 
impartiality, it is largely one the State brought upon itself by 
continuing the practice of popularly electing judges.23 
And Justice Scalia seized on the point:  
‘[T]he greater power to dispense with elections altogether 
does not include the lesser power to conduct elections un-
der conditions of state-imposed voter ignorance.  If the State 
chooses to tap the energy and the legitimizing power of the 
democratic process, it must accord the participants in that 
process . . . the First Amendment rights that attach to their 
roles.’24 
Although White was laudable in some ways,25 its crowning feature 
was, regrettably, its corrosive effect on judicial ethics regulation.  It 
 
 23. White, 536 U.S. at 792 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 24. Id. at 788 (majority opinion) (alterations in original) (quoting Renne v. Geary, 501 
U.S. 312, 349 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting)). 
 25. Although the litigation aftermath of (and some of the language in) White was high-
ly problematic, the result was palatable.  See, e.g., Keith A. Swisher, The Moral Judge, 56 
DRAKE L. REV. 637, 670–71 (2008) (arguing that the White result was laudable insofar as it 
lifted the flawed “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy in judicial regulation); see also Viet D. Dinh, 
Threats to Judicial Independence, Real and Imagined, 95 GEO. L.J. 929, 937 (2007) (“It certainly 
is proper for Senators to inquire about nominees’ general judicial philosophies and inter-
pretive methodologies.”); Vicki C. Jackson, Packages of Judicial Independence: The Selection and 
Tenure of Article III Judges, 95 GEO. L.J. 965, 977 n.45 (2007) (“Inquiries as to interpretive 
methodology, though sometimes used as a proxy for substantive ideology, may pose fewer 
risks of creating the appearance of seeking, or giving, ‘assurances’ or precommitments, 
because its application may be uncertain in particular cases.”).  Another salutary develop-
ment following White was the ethical codification of open-mindedness.  See White, 536 U.S. 
at 775–78 (defining impartiality as “lack of bias for or against either party” or “as 
openmindedness,” which “in a judge demands, not that he have no preconceptions on le-
gal issues, but that he be willing to consider views that oppose his preconceptions, and re-
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bogged down judicial regulators, who were already understaffed and 
underfunded, in years of First Amendment litigation. Post-White and 
pre-Caperton,26 moreover, commentators were predicting and has-
tening an end to judicial campaign regulation, and regulators were 
living in fear of the First Amendment.27  The following is a telling 
summary of the post-White, pre-Caperton picture: 
The increasing and often successful attacks on [a] wide array 
of canons have left state bodies charged with regulating ju-
dicial conduct in disarray, especially when applying canons 
applicable to campaign conduct.  As one trial court ob-
served: “To say that there is considerable uncertainty regard-
ing the scope of the Supreme Court’s decision in White is an 
understatement . . . .”28 
 
main open to persuasion, when the issues arise in a pending case”).  Impartiality is now 
defined as the “absence of bias or prejudice in favor of, or against, particular parties or 
classes of parties, as well as maintenance of an open mind in considering issues that may 
come before a judge.”  MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Terminology (2007); see also 
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Terminology (2004) (using substantively identical 
language). 
 26. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009); see also infra Part II (discuss-
ing Caperton’s impact). 
 27. See, e.g., Steven Lubet, Judicial Campaign Speech and the Third Law of Motion, 22 
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 425, 426 (2008) (forecasting that bans on extraju-
dicial speech may be doomed by expanding First Amendment doctrine); Bopp & 
Woudenberg, supra note 20 at 332–33 (concluding that disciplining judges for failing to 
recuse themselves would be unconstitutional to the extent it “chill[s]” campaign speech 
protected by the First Amendment). 
 28. Deborah Goldberg, James Sample & David E. Pozen, The Best Defense: Why Elected 
Courts Should Lead Recusal Reform, 46 WASHBURN L.J. 503, 508 (2007) (alteration in origi-
nal) (citation omitted) (quoting in part N.D. Family Alliance, Inc. v. Bader, 361 F. Supp. 
2d 1021, 1041 (D.N.D. 2005)); see also id. at 515 (arguing that, although some recent scan-
dals have driven recusal reform, “it is the White ruling more than any other development 
that now has the potential to alter the nature and practice of judicial disqualification”); 
David E. Pozen, The Irony of Judicial Elections, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 265, 297–98 (2008) (not-
ing the many post-White challenges to various canons).  Indeed, for years now, the Ameri-
can Judicature Society has maintained a running study of White consequences.  See Am. Ju-
dicature Soc’y, Case-law Following Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765 
(2002), 1 (last visited July 9, 2012), http://www.ajs.org/ethics/pdfs/CaselawafterWhite.pdf  
(tracking cases that have “challeng[ed] restrictions on campaign and political conduct by 
judges and judicial candidates”); Cynthia Gray, Am. Judicature Soc’y, Developments Following 
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002) (last visited July 9, 2012), 
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Perhaps even more disturbingly, however, some courts and 
commentators persuasively argued that if a judge had a right to an-
nounce a certain view, such as “tough on crime,” she should not face 
a corresponding duty to recuse herself for exercising her right.29  
Caperton, however, brought imperfect relief, through a case in which 
“bad” facts finally made some good law.30  
II.  COUNTERWEIGHT: CAPERTON V. A.T. MASSEY COAL 
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co. is the second case in our constitu-
tional ethics trilogy.31  It is a “pathbreaking” and “momentous” Su-
 
http://www.ajs.org/ethics/pdfs/DevelopmentsafterWhite.pdf  (tracking developments, on 
both the state and federal levels, following from the White decision).  Similarly, the Bren-
nan Center for Justice provides another tally.  See Brennan Ctr. for Justice at N.Y.U. Sch. L., 
Summaries of Relevant Cases Decided Since Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 
http://www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/summaries_of_relevant_cases_decided
_since_republican_party_of_minnesota_v_w (last visited July 9, 2012) (summarizing cases 
decided after White). 
 29. See, e.g., Bopp & Woudenberg, supra note 20, at 332–33 (concluding that disciplin-
ing judges for failing to recuse themselves would be unconstitutional to the extent it 
“chill[s]” campaign speech protected by the First Amendment).  To be sure, Justice Ken-
nedy’s concurrence nodded approvingly to stricter recusal provisions, White, 536 U.S. at 
794 (Kennedy, J., concurring), but the majority’s holding strongly suggested to the contra-
ry. 
 30. Chief Justice Roberts reached the opposite conclusion, claiming that the majority’s 
opinion exemplified the “legal aphorism: ‘Hard cases make bad law.’”  Caperton, 556 U.S. 
at 899 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).  His conclusion hardly follows: “Few situations more se-
verely threaten trust in the judicial process than the perception that a litigant never had a 
chance because the decisionmaker may have owed the other side special favors.”  Martin 
H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the Values of Procedural Due 
Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 483 (1986). 
 31. Caperton has quickly generated a strong literature.  See Comment, Caperton v. A.T. 
Massey Coal Co.: Due Process Limitations on the Appearance of Judicial Bias, 123 HARV. L. REV. 
73 (2009) (discussing the case and the Court’s reasoning); Pamela S. Karlan, Electing Judges, 
Judging Elections, and the Lessons of Caperton, 123 HARV. L. REV. 80 (2009) (discussing Caper-
ton’s contribution to discussions on judicial elections and “judicial regulation of politics”); 
Lawrence Lessig, What Everybody Knows and What Too Few Accept, 123 HARV. L. REV. 104 
(2009) (addressing the issues of independence and improper dependence concerning 
campaign contributions); Penny J. White, Relinquished Responsibilities, 123 HARV. L. REV. 120 
(2009) (discussing the opinions in Caperton in conjunction with the Due Process Clause 
concerns raised by judicial elections).  For an excellent symposium on the issue, see Sym-
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preme Court decision from 2009.32  Caperton, to be sure, said nothing 
about the First Amendment—it never even uttered those words.  The 
case was instead about due process: In particular, the Court grappled 
with the extent to which money (both independent expenditures and 
campaign contributions) spent assisting a judge’s election created an 
intolerable risk of bias in that judge.  The petitioner’s question to the 
Court concisely framed the issue: 
 [Acting Chief] Justice Brent Benjamin of the Supreme 
Court of Appeals of West Virginia refused to recuse himself 
from the appeal of the $50 million jury verdict in this case, 
even though the CEO of the lead defendant[, Don Blanken-
ship,] spent $3 million supporting his campaign for a seat 
on the court—more than 60% of the total amount spent to 
support Justice Benjamin’s campaign—while preparing to 
appeal the verdict against his company.[33] After winning 
election to the court, Justice Benjamin cast the deciding vote 
in the court’s 3-2 decision overturning that verdict. The 
 
posium, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 215 (2010).  For my own take 
on the case, from which I have liberally borrowed for this short Part, see Keith Swisher, Pro-
Prosecution Judges: “Tough on Crime,” Soft on Strategy, Ripe for Disqualification, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 
317, 339–51 (2010) [hereinafter Swisher, Pro-Prosecution Judges]. 
 32. See James J. Sample, Caperton: Correct Today, Compelling Tomorrow, 60 SYRACUSE L. 
REV. 293, 298 (2010) [hereinafter Sample, Correct Today, Compelling Tomorrow] (noting that 
Caperton is “a pathbreaking decision of momentous import for the future of judicial elec-
tions and disputes over judicial bias” (internal quotations marks omitted)); Caperton, 556 
U.S. at 872 (holding that due process requires state court judges to recuse themselves from 
cases in which parties have directly contributed, or independently expended, large sums of 
money in support of the judges’ election).   
 33. The three million-plus that Blankenship spent on the campaign was itemized as 
follows:  
In addition to contributing the $1,000 statutory maximum to Benjamin’s cam-
paign committee, Blankenship donated almost $2.5 million to “And For The Sa-
ke Of The Kids,” a political organization formed under 26 U.S.C. § 527. . . . 
Blankenship’s donations accounted for more than two-thirds of the total funds it 
raised. . . . Blankenship spent, in addition, just over $500,000 on independent 
expenditures—for direct mailings and letters soliciting donations as well as tele-
vision and newspaper advertisements—“to support . . . Brent Benjamin.” 
Id. at 873 (third alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Blankenship’s state 
campaign financial disclosure filings); see also DonLBlankenship, YOUTUBE (Sept. 8, 2010), 
http://www.youtube.com/user/DonLBlankenship#p/u (providing access to the television 
advertisements Blankenship funded during the election). 
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question presented is whether Justice Benjamin’s failure to 
recuse himself from participation in his principal financial 
supporter’s case violated the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.34 
The Supreme Court voted five to four that Benjamin’s failure to 
recuse himself violated the Due Process Clause.35 Justice Kennedy au-
thored the opinion, concluding that Benjamin harbored a “serious,” 
“objective” “probability of bias” when he refused to recuse himself in a 
case involving his biggest supporter from his previous—and perhaps 
future—election.36  
As suggested at the outset, the case was noticeably imperfect in 
that it never even mentioned the First Amendment.37  Caperton was 
and is relevant, however, because it treated recusal rules with un-
matched reverence.  States were not only free, but encouraged, to 
craft recusal rules stronger than the due process floor (that is, the rel-
atively low point at which a judge’s “probability” of bias becomes con-
stitutionally intolerable).38  The Court, furthermore, explicitly blessed 
 
 34. Brief for Petitioners at i, Caperton, 556 U.S. 868 (No. 08-22), 2008 WL 5433361, at 
*i. 
 35. Caperton, 556 U.S. at 871–72. 
 36. Id at 872, 884, 886.  In its narrow form, the Court’s holding was “that Blankenship’s 
significant and disproportionate influence—coupled with the temporal relationship be-
tween the election and the pending case—offer a possible temptation to the average . . . 
judge to . . . lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and true.”  Id. at 886 (alterations 
in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Stated slightly differently, there was “a 
serious risk of actual bias—based on objective and reasonable perceptions—when a person 
with a personal stake in a particular case had a significant and disproportionate influence 
in placing the judge on the case by raising funds or directing the judge’s election cam-
paign when the case was pending or imminent.”  Id. at 884; see also Keith Swisher, Legal Eth-
ics and Campaign Contributions: The Professional Responsibility to Pay for Justice, 24 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 225 (2011) (providing context for measuring influence and bias). 
 37. Although the Court itself never mentioned the First Amendment, both the Court 
and the parties in their briefs cited the White opinion.  Caperton, 556 U.S. at 889; see also, 
e.g., Brief for Petitioners, supra note 34, at v (indicating locations of citations to White with-
in the brief). 
 38. See Caperton, 556 U.S. at 889 (“States may choose to adopt recusal standards more 
rigorous than due process requires.”  (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also id. at 
889–90 (reiterating that “states, of course, remain free to impose more rigorous standards 
for judicial disqualification than those we find mandated here today” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)); Sample, Correct Today, Compelling Tomorrow, supra note 32, at 303–04 (ob-
serving that Caperton “provides real momentum for state-based recusal reform efforts”).  
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“the judicial reforms the States have implemented to eliminate even 
the appearance of partiality.”39  Moreover, even without an explicit 
First Amendment reference, the context—in which a citizen had sup-
ported one justice and opposed another through independent expendi-
tures—spoke loudly.40  Thus, under current First Amendment doc-
trine, the supporter had clearly exercised First Amendment-protected 
freedoms to speak in a sense.41  To be sure, the Justice’s speech was 
not in issue, but regulating matters of speech and money concerning 
an elected judge or his supporter necessarily risks affecting the judge 
at the polls or in his conduct.  Yet, recusal law and the Due Process 
Clause carried the day.42   
In sum, Caperton swung the pendulum away from the First 
Amendment, but regulators would have to wait until the third and fi-
nal case of this ethics trilogy before the Court again directly addressed 
the looming First Amendment.  
III.  CLOSURE: NEVADA COMMISSION ON ETHICS v. CARRIGAN 
Almost exactly two years later, the Supreme Court has now, argu-
ably, closed the can of worms.  In Nevada Commission on Ethics v. Carri-
gan,43 the Supreme Court upheld Nevada’s Ethics in Government 
Law, which requires (in short) that public officials refrain from voting 
on matters in which they have personal interests.44  In Carrigan, a city 
 
Even Chief Justice Roberts, in dissent, explicitly agreed: “States are, of course, free to 
adopt broader recusal rules than the Constitution requires—and every State has—but 
these developments are not continuously incorporated into the Due Process Clause.”  
Caperton, 556 U.S. at 893 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 39. Caperton, 556 U.S. at 888 (majority opinion). 
 40. Id. at 873. 
 41. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 18 (1976) (reasoning that limits on campaign 
expenditures are limits on protected political speech). 
 42. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 910 (2010) (discussing Caperton and not-
ing that “[t]he remedy of recusal was based on a litigant’s due process right to a fair trial 
before an unbiased judge.  Caperton’s holding was limited to the rule that the judge must 
be recused, not that the litigant’s political speech could be banned.” (citation omitted)).  
In light of the influence and timing of the expenditures, moreover, the Caperton opinion 
contained this theme: “Just as no man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, similar 
fears of bias can arise when—without the consent of the other parties—a man chooses the 
judge in his own cause.”  Caperton, 556 U.S. at 886.  I return briefly to this theme in Part IV. 
 43. 131 S. Ct. 2343 (2011). 
 44. Id. at 2346–47. 
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council member voted to approve a casino even though his campaign 
manager and close friend had a financial interest in the casino’s de-
velopment.45  The Nevada Ethics Commission censured the council 
member for his actions, and in response he brought a First Amend-
ment challenge, claiming in part that his vote constituted protected 
speech.46  Rejecting the challenge, the Court found (again in short) 
that recusal rules in these circumstances do not, and did not ever, vio-
late the First Amendment.47  The Court was unanimous as to the re-
sult—and nearly so as to the reasoning.48  And bringing our trilogy of 
Supreme Court cases full circle, the first case that the Carrigan Court 
cited on the merits was, surprisingly, White.49 
A narrow reading of the Carrigan opinion is simply this: Even if 
legislators intend to express deeply held beliefs through their votes, 
the “act of voting [i]s still nonsymbolic conduct engaged in for an in-
dependent governmental purpose.”50  In other words, “a legislator has 
no right to use official powers for expressive purposes.”51  But the nar-
row holding is only half the point: The Court unanimously justified 
this holding by using the historical strength of recusal laws, both legis-
lative and judicial.52  Immediately below, I explain why Carrigan is 
generally outstanding for judicial recusal law, although it rests on 
 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 2347. 
 47. Id. at 2350–51.  A contrary holding would have, once again, struck First Amend-
ment fear in the hearts of judicial ethics regulators.  Cf. Brief for Reporters Comm. for 
Freedom of the Press et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 13–14,  Carrigan, 131 
S. Ct. 2343 (No. 10-568), 2011 WL 882593, at *13–14 (worrying that several canons of judi-
cial ethics could be put into constitutional jeopardy if the Court applied First Amendment 
strict scrutiny analysis to Nevada’s recusal scheme). 
 48. Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. at 2346 (majority opinion); id. at 2352 (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring); id. at 2354 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 49. Id. at 2348 (majority opinion). 
 50. Id. at 2350–51. 
 51. Id. at 2351.  
 52. See id. at 2347–49 (noting the “long-established tradition” of judicial and legislative 
recusal statutes); see also id. at 2352 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (joining the Court’s opinion 
but writing separately to express reservations about possible infringement of associational 
rights by legislative, but not judicial, recusal law); id. at 2355 (Alito, J., concurring) (con-
cluding that legislative voting is indeed expressive conduct, but nevertheless concurring 
because “recusal rules were not regarded during the founding era as impermissible re-
strictions on freedom of speech”). 
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shaky analytical ground.  I then unearth a few ways in which the case 
and its theories present both concern and promise for the future.    
IV.  CONGRATULATIONS, CONCERN, AND CONVALESCENCE 
The majority and two concurring opinions in Carrigan are rele-
vant and indeed crucial to judicial ethics for at least four reasons: (1) 
the essentially unanimous opinion of the Court strongly validates the 
historical pedigree and constitutional legitimacy of American recusal 
laws, both legislative and judicial;53 (2) both Justice Scalia (for the 
opinion of the Court) and Justice Kennedy (for his own pivotal self) 
suggest that recusal rules may, understandably, be crafted more rigidly 
for the judiciary than for the legislature;54 (3) the Court draws an im-
 
 53. In support of federal judicial recusal laws, the Court listed the following evidence: 
  Federal conflict-of-interest rules applicable to judges also date back to the 
founding.  In 1792, Congress passed a law requiring district court judges to recu-
se themselves if they had a personal interest in a suit or had been counsel to a 
party appearing before them.  In 1821, Congress expanded these bases for 
recusal to include situations in which “the judge . . . is so related to, or connect-
ed with, either party, as to render it improper for him, in his opinion, to sit on 
the trial of such suit.”  The statute was again expanded in 1911, to make any 
“personal bias or prejudice” a basis for recusal.  The current version, which re-
tains much of the 1911 version’s language, is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 144. 
Id. at 2348–49 (majority opinion) (citations omitted).  The Court listed the state evidence 
as follows:  
  A number of States enacted early judicial recusal laws as well.  See, e.g., 1797 
Vt. Laws, § 23, p. 178 (“[N]o justice of the peace shall take cognizance of any 
cause, where he shall be within either the first, second, third, or fourth degree of 
affinity, or consanguinity, to either of the parties, or shall be directly or indirectly 
interested, in the cause or matter to be determined”); 1818 Mass. Laws, § 5, p. 
632 (“[W]henever any Judge of Probate shall be interested in the estate of any 
person deceased, within the county of such Judge, such estate shall be settled in 
the Probate Court of the most ancient next adjoining county . . .”); Macon v. 
Huff, 60 Ga. 221, 223–226 (1878). 
Id. at 2349 n.4 (alterations in original). 
 54. As Justice Scalia noted in the Court’s opinion, “[t]here are of course differences 
between a legislator’s vote and a judge’s, and thus between legislative and judicial recusal 
rules; nevertheless, there do not appear to have been any serious challenges to judicial 
recusal statutes as having unconstitutionally restricted judges’ First Amendment rights.”  
Id. at 2349 (footnote omitted); see also id. at 2349 n.3 (distinguishing White).  Justice Ken-
nedy somewhat similarly noted in his concurrence: 
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portant First Amendment distinction between campaign conduct and 
official conduct (such as a failure to recuse from voting);55 and (4) 
the majority opinion provides a way to conceptualize judges’ votes 
that may pay future dividends toward reconciling and crafting recusal 
law.56  Carrigan thus presents remarkable promise for ushering in a 
new era of solidarity and hope in recusal law.  The capstone of this 
constitutional trilogy therefore deserves congratulations to that ex-
tent, and it is congratulations that no court or commentator has yet 
granted the opinion.   
Carrigan and its reasoning, however, typify a growing problem in 
constitutional theory, and this problem is amplified when applied to 
legal and judicial ethics.  Before I look further to the opinion’s prom-
ise, I address its Trojan-horse-like problems in the next Section.   
A.  Concern: Gerontology and Ethics 
Among many other famous remarks, Justice Holmes captured 
our realist hearts by noting that “[i]t is revolting to have no better 
reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of 
Henry IV.”57  Moving from realist to critical, though, our cherished 
principles—including the First Amendment, “fundamental rights,” 
and due process—-can be corrupted into historical relics and thereby 
 
  The Court has held that due process may require recusal in the context of 
certain judicial determinations, see Caperton . . . .  The differences between the 
role of political bodies in formulating and enforcing public policy, on the one 
hand, and the role of courts in adjudicating individual disputes according to law, 
on the other, may call for a different understanding of the responsibilities at-
tendant upon holders of those respective offices and of the legitimate re-
strictions that may be imposed upon them. 
Id. at 2353 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citations omitted). 
 55. See id. at 2349 n.3  (majority opinion) (distinguishing White because it dealt with 
campaign-trail conduct, not acts or omissions in office).    
 56. See infra Part IV.B; see also Posting of Keith Swisher to The Judicial Ethics Forum, A 
Supreme Victory for Government Ethics and Judicial Recusal (June 14, 2011), 
http://judicialethicsforum.com/2011/06/14/a-supreme-victory-for-government-ethics-
and-judicial-recusal/. 
 57. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Supreme Judicial Court of Mass., Address at the 
Dedication of the New Hall of the Boston University School of Law: The Path of the Law 
(Jan. 8, 1897), in 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897); see also id. (noting further that “[i]t is 
still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, 
and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past”). 
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become deserving of Holmes’s criticism.58  Although Carrigan has 
much to commend it, it is also a pointed example of problematic con-
stitutional theory that transcends far beyond one case.  It is a theory 
of keeping law old and outdated, and the theory is further complicat-
ed by the Court’s sloppy application.  Both the methodology and the 
merit of the Court’s theory are addressed below.   
1.  Historiographical Analysis: Older Is Looser 
The Court’s methodology in historical inquiry employs essentially 
four factors designed to determine whether any given practice59 
should survive constitutional scrutiny.  In order of seeming im-
portance to the Court, the four factors follow: (1) contemporaneity;60 
(2) longevity;61 (3) uniformity;62 and (4) dormancy.63  Below, I analyze 
 
 58. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 710 (1997) (explaining that in 
due process cases, courts “begin . . . by examining our Nation’s history, legal traditions, 
and practices” and concluding that banning all physician-assisted suicide of competent, 
terminally ill patients does not violate a fundamental right).  Professor Erwin Chemerinsky 
notes:  
  These examples [of Supreme Court decisions]—drawn from substantive due 
process, criminal procedure provisions such as the Fourth and Eighth Amend-
ments, and the First Amendment—are simply representative illustrations of a 
much larger body of cases.  Common to these cases is the Supreme Court’s use 
of history and tradition to reject claims of individual rights.  The Court openly 
declares that the scope of constitutional rights is limited to that which has been 
historically protected. 
Erwin Chemerinsky, History, Tradition, the Supreme Court, and the First Amendment, 44 
HASTINGS L.J. 901, 907 (1993). 
 59. By practice, I mean any conduct under examination as to whether it is or was legal-
ly permissible or impermissible (for example, whether judges must recuse themselves from 
cases in which their spouses have a financial interest in the outcome; or whether certain 
groups may vote in an election). 
 60. To determine contemporaneity, the Court measures the temporal distance be-
tween the beginning of the practice under scrutiny and the Constitution’s drafting (and if 
applicable, the amendment’s ratification).   
 61. Here the Court looks for the length of time that the practice (or ban) has endured 
in this country.  For lengthy practices, the Court calls them “tradition.”  See, e.g., Nev. 
Comm’n on Ethics v. Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. 2343, 2347–48 (2011).  It is important to note 
that a lengthy practice (since 1924) might have started many years after the Constitution 
or the relevant amendment.  It thus occupies a decidedly distinct axis than contemporane-
ity occupies, although the Carrigan Court conflated the two factors.  See, e.g., id. (demon-
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problems of rigor in the application of each of these four related fac-
tors.   
Carrigan quintessentially illustrates the Court’s lack of methodo-
logical rigor.64  The Court ran together the first two factors, namely, 
contemporaneity and longevity, to which we now turn.  By contempo-
raneity, I mean that the Court measures the temporal distance be-
tween the beginning of the practice under scrutiny and the Constitu-
tion’s drafting (and if applicable, the amendment’s ratification): 
shorter is better.  By longevity, I mean that the Court measures the 
length of time that the practice has endured in this country: longer is 
better.  When considering the practice of recusal regulation, the 
Court was enamored with the early congressional enactments of both 
legislative and judicial recusal rules.65  “That evidence is dispositive 
here” of the constitutional question.66 
 
strating a “long-established tradition of prohibiting certain conduct” by referring to 
“[e]arly congressional enactments”). 
 62. That is, whether all, most, or at least many of the states have adopted the practice 
under scrutiny.  A critical mass of states following a contrary practice obviously would de-
stroy or at least diminish uniformity. 
 63. Dormancy means that the practice has gone (largely) unchallenged. 
 64. Of course, this is not the first (or last) objection to the Court’s methodology in 
studying and using history.  See, e.g., Martin S. Flaherty, History “Lite” in Modern American 
Constitutionalism, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 523, 526 (1995) (“[H]abits of poorly supported gen-
eralization—which at times fall below even the standards of undergraduate history writ-
ing—pervade the work of many of the most rigorous theorists when they invoke the past to 
talk about the Constitution.”); Neil M. Richards, Clio and the Court: A Reassessment of the Su-
preme Court’s Uses of History, 13 J.L. & POL. 809, 826, 883–84 (1997) (“[T]he Court continues 
to . . . ask questions of the past that the past cannot answer.”); Lucian E. Dervan, Com-
ment, Selective Conceptions of Federalism: The Selective Use of History in the Supreme Court’s States’ 
Rights Opinions, 50 EMORY L.J. 1295, 1321–28 (2001) (outlining the Court’s reliance on 
selective history).  Historian Alfred Kelly provided the prime critique.  See Alfred H. Kelly, 
Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 119, 157 (calling the “present use 
of history by the Court . . . a Marxist-type perversion of the relation between truth and util-
ity”); see also id. at 122 (defining the Court’s “‘law-office’ history” as “the selection of data 
favorable to the position being advanced without regard to or concern for contradictory 
data or proper evaluation of the relevance of the data proffered”). 
 65. Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. at 2348 (“[E]arly congressional enactments ‘provid[e] contem-
poraneous and weighty evidence of the Constitution’s meaning.’” (alterations in original) 
(quoting Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905 (1997))). 
 66. Id. (emphasis added). 
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Although the Court’s conclusion is a strong win for recusal, it is 
nevertheless concerning for the future—in part because the Court 
appears to follow few rules to ensure rigor in its measurements.  In-
terestingly, for example, this “dispositive” evidence included a fifteen-
year gap from the nation’s founding to the adoption of the Senate 
recusal rules.67  The Court correctly noted that the House adopted a 
recusal rule in 1789.68  In its next breath, however, the Court passingly 
noted that the “first Senate rules did not include a recusal require-
ment,” and when the subject was finally addressed fifteen years later, 
the resulting recusal rule was not adopted by the full Senate, but only 
by its President (who, granted, was Thomas Jefferson).69  The Court 
immediately likened this “dispositive” history to that of federal judicial 
recusal laws (and later, state judicial recusal laws).70  
Interestingly again, although the Court began with federal judi-
cial recusal evidence from 1792, it then cited evidence from 1821 and 
even 1911.71  Surely, the Court cannot mean that congressional acts in 
1911 are also “contemporaneous and weighty evidence of the Consti-
tution’s [original] meaning;”72 it must instead mean that a centennial 
of practice is old and therefore wise.  For Justice Scalia in particular, a 
hundred-years-old practice is more than old enough.73  Similarly, for 
 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. (“No member shall vote on any question, in the event of which he is immediate-
ly and particularly interested.”  (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 99 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 
1834))). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 2348–49. 
 71. Id.  It is important to note that, although these recusal citations were amendments 
to what generally is the same recusal statute (currently, 28 U.S.C. § 455), each amendment 
significantly broadened the statute’s scope by adding new bases for judicial disqualifica-
tion, as the Court acknowledged.  Id.  Thus, we are not dealing with merely technical 
changes to a statute that has remained substantively the same throughout the country’s 
history.   
 72. Id.   
 73. See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 375–77 (1995) (Scalia, 
J., dissenting) (finding eighty-year ban persuasive of constitutional meaning).  But older is 
even better.  See Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2832–34, 2836 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(referring to the tests for acceptance as (1) “a long history of practice,” (2) “regulation 
that had been widely used by the States since the end of the 19th Century,” (3) “govern-
mental practice that has become general throughout the United States, and particularly 
one that has the validation of long, accepted usage,” or (4) “longstanding and unques-
tioned,” but concluding that a practice first instituted in the states “in 1888, and almost 90 
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the historical evidence of state judicial recusal laws, the Court cited 
laws from three, far-from-tightly-grouped years: 1797, 1818, and 
1878.74   
This lack of rigor in establishing relevant years, temporal dis-
tances, or requisite longevity presents aggravated problems for the fu-
ture of judicial ethics regulation of elective judiciaries.  Judicial elec-
tions were virtually nonexistent at the time of the founding; they be-
began to appear in the first quarter of the 1800s, with significant 
growth in the mid-1800s.75  Because the Court has applied a lack of 
rigor in analyzing the relevant dates or date-ranges, we have little idea 
what this complex history will mean for related judicial ethics regula-
tion. 
Even if the Court would articulate a time window of relevance 
(which it has to date failed to do), an additional concern is the broad 
and narrow framing of the practices under scrutiny.  In Carrigan, the 
Court went with broad framing, that is, lumping all recusal laws to-
gether and then checking whether recusal laws were on the books 
near the founding (and fortunately some were).76  The question is 
whether future cases will frame the question more narrowly by, for 
 
percent of the States had followed . . . by 1896” was nevertheless insufficient in light of ear-
lier, contrary practice at the founding and the fact that apparently no one had explicitly 
raised First Amendment concerns with the earlier practice); cf. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 
397, 399, 428 (1989) (striking down an anti-flag-burning law on First Amendment 
grounds; although forty-eight states prohibited such conduct, they had done so only since 
approximately 1917). 
 74. Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. at 2349 n.4; see generally John P. Frank, Disqualification of Judges, 
56 YALE L.J. 605, 612–26 (1947) (citing several state examples from the mid to late 1800s).  
To be sure, the Court also drew example from a 1878 state case, City of Macon v. Huff, 60 
Ga. 221 (1878).  That case does not involve legislative or judicial recusal but rather a mild-
ly analogous situation in which the mayor had entered into a personal contract with the 
city council.  Huff, 60 Ga. at 223–24.  The case does cite, however, a state judicial recusal 
statute from 1801 prohibiting judicial officers from sitting in cases in which they were “pe-
cuniarily interested,” former counsel, or related to a party, an 1850 statute prohibiting 
sheriffs and similar officers from purchasing at sheriff’s sales, and an 1872 statute (later 
declared unconstitutional on other grounds) prohibiting municipal officers for contract-
ing with the corporation for treasury payments.  Id. at 225–28. 
 75. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 785–86 (2002) (describing 
the history of judicial elections); Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Economic Crisis and the Rise 
of Judicial Elections and Judicial Review, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1061, 1093–1115 (2010) (chroni-
cling the move to judicial elections from 1846 to 1851). 
 76. Nev. Comm’n on Ethics v. Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. 2343, 2348–49, 2349 n.4 (2011). 
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example, asking whether a particular type of recusal law is the right 
amount of “old.”  Narrowly framing the question would not be novel; 
White followed it.77  Indeed, the Court even has a name for this (or 
something like this) approach—the most “specific level” of abstrac-
tion.78    
Turning to the third factor, and moving a bit away from the old, 
the Court also asks whether the practice was uniform.  But uniformity 
necessarily means that it was popular with the controlling majorities 
in most or all states.79  Bowing to majorities’ preferences, however, is 
deeply adverse to the judiciary’s purpose.80  Furthermore, the Court 
gives no test for discerning the requisite amount of uniformity.  It is 
 
 77. White, 536 U.S. at 785 (analyzing the relatively narrow “practice of prohibiting 
speech by judicial candidates on disputed issues” and finding that practice “neither long 
nor universal”).  Judicial ethics, of course, regulates judges’ speech in many other ways, 
both on and off the campaign trail; the White Court discussed none of them. 
 78. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127–28 n.6 (1989) (“We refer to the most 
specific level at which a relevant tradition protecting, or denying protection to, the assert-
ed right can be identified.”).  Not all justices wholly accept this formulation, however.  See 
id. at 132 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (refusing to join the footnote because “[o]n occa-
sion the Court has characterized relevant traditions protecting asserted rights at levels of 
generality that might not be the most specific level available” and wishing not to “foreclose 
the unanticipated by the prior imposition of a single mode of historical analysis”) (cita-
tions omitted) (internal quotations marks omitted). 
 79. To be sure, the diversity of the states gives us some assurance that certain practices 
would not be uniform across the states.  Similarly, if the Court required strict uniformity 
(perhaps unanimity) it would provide some assurance that controversial practices would 
fail this factor. 
 80. See, for example, Raines v. Byrd, in which the Court stated:  
  `“The irreplaceable value of the power articulated by Mr. Chief Justice Mar-
shall [in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803),] lies in the protec-
tion it has afforded the constitutional rights and liberties of individual citizens 
and minority groups against oppressive or discriminatory government action.  It 
is this role, not some amorphous general supervision of the operations of gov-
ernment, that has maintained public esteem for the federal courts and has per-
mitted the peaceful coexistence of the countermajoritarian implications of judi-
cial review and the democratic principles upon which our Federal Government 
in the final analysis rests.” 
521 U.S. 811, 828–29 (1997) (quoting United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 192 
(1974) (Powell, J., concurring)); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) 
(noting the need for judicial independence to protect the minority against majority over-
reaching). 
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entirely unanswered whether that amount means all states, all states 
having legislated on the practice, a super-majority of states, or a ma-
jority of states, as examples.  Indeed, what little is in the Carrigan and 
other opinions suggests that a “uniform” practice might even consist 
of something less than a majority of states.81   
With respect to the fourth factor, finally, the Court tells us that 
dormancy is good; in other words, if no one has raised a “serious chal-
lenge” for (some unknown number of) years, the practice is constitu-
tional and indeed a candidate for fundamental liberty.  In Carrigan, 
just for example, the Court observed that “there do not appear to 
have been any serious challenges to judicial recusal statutes as having 
unconstitutionally restricted judges’ First Amendment rights.”82  Even 
ignoring the Court’s surprisingly sloppy use of nineteenth century 
state practices (before the First Amendment was even incorporated 
against the states) to prove First Amendment consistency,83 this factor 
suggests another serious caution.  The Court did not grapple with the 
meaning of either “serious” or “challenges.”84  Nor did it grapple with 
 
 81. See Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. at 2349 & n.4 (citing “a number of states” for two proposi-
tions: (1) “States, by common-law rule, have long required recusal of public officials with a 
conflict;” and (2) “States enacted early judicial recusal laws as well”).  For each proposi-
tion, the Court cites only three states as examples.  Id.  In another example, however, the 
Court observed that “90 percent” of the states prohibited a certain practice for nearly 100 
years and reasoned that “this widespread and time-tested consensus” should guide its First 
Amendment analysis.  Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 205–06 (1992). 
 82. Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. at 2349; see also id. at 2349 n.3 (distinguishing White because 
that case involved a candidate’s campaign speech for judicial election). 
 83. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (incorporating First Amendment rights 
to apply to the states).  I thank Michael O’Connor for noting the timing issue.   
 84. For example, whether one challenge would be sufficient; whether that challenge 
needs to raise the First Amendment (or whether another constitutional question would 
suffice); and whether the challenge needs to have been lodged in a judicial forum (as op-
posed to, say, Congress or a newspaper).  Apparently in Carrigan, however, each of these 
questions would have been answered in the negative: “The Nevada Supreme Court and 
Carrigan have not cited a single decision invalidating a generally applicable conflict-of-
interest recusal rule—and such rules have been commonplace for over 200 years.”  131 S. 
Ct. at 2348.  The Court, however, never clarified what it meant by a “generally applicable” 
recusal rule, and what, if any, non-“generally applicable” recusal rules it meant to distin-
guish.   
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more mundane questions, such as why seemingly irrelevant publica-
tion factors should impact constitutional interpretation.85   
The Court thus provides no indication of the requisite timing, 
frequency, and venue of any “serious challenges” to the practice.  This 
dormancy requirement—depending on what it actually endeavors to 
include—is again troubling for the judiciary.  The politically and fis-
cally powerless (or underpowered) are less likely to have been in a po-
sition to challenge a practice.86  When they finally have an opportuni-
ty to challenge it, they should not be turned away because they lacked 
power to bring several challenges in several places over several years.   
In sum, each criterion is problematic for the judiciary to employ, 
and the primary criteria (age and tradition) are particularly degener-
ative for ethical decisions. 
2.  Superannuated Constitutional Theory: Older Is Older 
The most striking characteristic of the four factors is not their 
methodological indeterminacy but their geriatric emphasis: the older, 
the better.  This old-is-better bias, however, seems to be particularly 
problematic for ethical inquiries: the values of men in 1787 through 
 
 85. For example, whether a court’s decision to publish an opinion should be conse-
quential at all to the interpretation of a constitutional provision, and whether the decision 
of a private publisher, such as West, impacting if and when certain court orders and opin-
ions are published should also be consequential to the interpretation of a constitutional 
provision.  The upside, of course, is administrability: with the advent of electronic legal 
databases, the inquiry into published challenges is relatively easy and the result is relatively 
provable. 
 86. Justices Stevens and Breyer raised similar concerns about political powerlessness in 
Raines.  Justice Stevens stated:  
  The majority’s reference to the absence of any similar suit in earlier dis-
putes . . . does not strike me as particularly relevant.  First, the fact that others 
did not choose to bring suit does not necessarily mean the Constitution would 
have precluded them from doing so.  Second, because Congress did not author-
ize declaratory judgment actions until the federal Declaratory Judgment Act of 
1934, the fact that President Johnson did not bring such an action in 1868 is not 
entirely surprising. 
Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 838 n.3 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).  
Justice Breyer questioned reliance on “lawsuits that were not brought.”  Id. at 843 (Breyer, 
J., dissenting); see also Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the 
Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 97–104 (1974) (discussing systemic distor-
tion of legal rules by repeat, and often wealthy, players). 
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1791 are, at best, underrepresentative of our pluralist society and, at 
worst, patently offensive.87  Similarly, values in the nineteenth and 
even early twentieth centuries are often underdeveloped by today’s 
standards.  Professional ethics codes, likewise, were in a primitive 
(and to a significant extent, nonexistent) state.  Codified judicial eth-
ics, in particular, had not yet even been born, and it would not be un-
til significantly into the twentieth century before the ethics codes took 
firm root across the country.88  Thus, our personal and professional 
ethics have evolved substantially in more recent times,89 and it revers-
es our ethical development to take an overly geriatric approach to 
these questions.   
The “dispositive” historical analysis provokes another concern.  
In Carrigan, unlike White, history was on recusal’s side.  That is, recusal 
rules have been on the books—and largely unchallenged—since 
(close to) the founding.  The same could not be said of the judicial 
campaign speech rules in White.90  Those particular rules were of rela-
tively recent vintage, and the states had not uniformly adopted those 
rules in any event.  “The practice of prohibiting speech by judicial 
 
 87. We stand for diversity both in values and in people in ways wholly unappreciated at 
the time of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights.  See, e.g., Katherine R. Kruse, Lawyers, 
Justice, and the Challenge of Moral Pluralism, 90 MINN. L. REV. 389, 394–402 (2005) (discuss-
ing the values of moral pluralism); cf. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003) (refer-
ring to diversity as a compelling interest). 
 88. See, e.g., Charles W. Wolfram, Toward a History of the Legalization of American Legal 
Ethics-I. Origins, 8 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 469, 471–72, 479–80 (2001). 
 89. See, for example, Lawrence v. Texas, which stated: 
  Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth 
Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment known the components of liberty in 
its manifold possibilities, they might have been more specific.  They did not pre-
sume to have this insight.  They knew times can blind us to certain truths and 
later generations can see that laws once thought necessary and proper in fact 
serve only to oppress.  As the Constitution endures, persons in every generation 
can invoke its principles in their own search for greater freedom. 
539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003); see also Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311–12 (2002) 
(“‘The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dig-
nity of man. . . .  The Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards 
of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.’” (alteration in original) 
(quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1958))).  
 90. Indeed, the Carrigan Court’s first substantive citation was to White—a belated and 
surprising ally to recusal law.  Nev. Comm’n on Ethics v. Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. 2343, 2348 
(2011). 
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candidates on disputed issues . . . is neither long nor universal,” at 
least according to Justice Scalia and four other Justices.91  It is, there-
fore, fundamentally unsettling to note that it was not until 1924 that 
the ABA produced the Canons of Judicial Ethics.92 
The divergent results above, then, owe mostly to history, not mer-
it.  Good governance might well mean that judges should refrain from 
announcing their views on disputed legal or political issues, and per-
haps because of this reason or another, recusal laws are unnecessary 
or even untoward.  Perhaps, for example, recusal laws—by encourag-
ing judges to run from, rather than deal professionally with, their bi-
ases—might fail to promote the type of inner strength that good 
judges should possess and exercise.93  But such appeals to conse-
quences or principles are largely irrelevant.  Instead, we look primari-
ly to whether the law is old—and the older the better.94  
The Carrigan reasoning is indeed justified on public confidence 
grounds (that is, without recusal law and regulation, litigants and ob-
servers would not believe that a judge will maintain independence, 
impartiality, and integrity in a case involving a personal conflict),95 
due process grounds (that is, the judge’s significant personal conflict 
 
 91. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 766, 785 (2002).  Again, Justice 
Scalia’s meaning of “long” seems to vary.  See Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit 
Love Affair, 1965 S. CT. REV. 119, 156 (noting that judges’ training and experience do not 
produce professional historians). 
 92. See generally JAMES J. ALFINI ET AL., JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS (4th ed. 2007) 
(providing background on judicial conduct statutes and rules); ROBERTS, C.J., supra note 
13, at 1–2 (commenting on the call for and development of the ABA’s first judicial ethics 
code).  The Canons served as the blueprint for judicial ethics codes across the country.  Id. 
at 2. 
 93. See, e.g., Sarah M.R. Cravens, In Pursuit of Actual Justice, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1 (2007) 
(proposing a significant curtailment of recusals and a requirement that judges provide 
thorough explanations of their decisions to bolster their legitimacy). 
 94. Justice Alito’s analysis was particularly striking on this point.  From a realist per-
spective, his conclusion that the restriction on state legislators might at times limit their 
freedom of speech rang true, but he was completely comfortable with suppressing that 
speech because such restrictions were permissible “during the founding era.”  Carrigan, 
131 S. Ct. at 2355 (Alito, J., concurring).  Thus, although both the Court’s opinion and 
Justice Alito’s concurrence lead to the same result, Justice Alito’s concurrence is notably 
frank in its sole criterion: history. 
 95. See, e.g., In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (quoting Offutt v. United States, 
348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954)) (noting that not only actual justice, but the “appearance of justice” 
must be satisfied). 
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effectively breaks the state’s promise of due process before taking life, 
liberty, or property),96 and other grounds (for example, counteract-
ing cognitive biases in the administration of government).97  It is im-
portant, however, to complain about this geriatric approach even 
when it accidentally leads to the right results.  The Court’s approach 
in Carrigan is arbitrary: Had history long permitted the types of con-
flicts exemplified by the case,98 it would have been made matters 
worse, not better.  This reasoning, moreover, is affirmatively against 
continuous improvement in the law generally.99   
At least in ethics cases (and presumably in others), we seemingly 
should instead view the Constitution as setting forth a timeless set of 
general principles—such as “due process,” “free speech,” and “equal 
protection”—to be applied in today’s cases, partly irrespective of his-
 
 96. See, e.g., supra Parts II, IV. 
 97. See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Stempel, In Praise of Procedurally Centered Judicial Disqualification—
And a Stronger Conception of the Appearance Standard: Better Acknowledging and Adjusting to 
Cognitive Bias, Spoliation, and Perceptual Realities, 30 REV. LITIG. 733, 740–49 (2011) (describ-
ing the effects of cognitive bias in judges). 
 98. In Carrigan, for example, the personal conflict involved the council member’s 
three-time campaign manager, whose PR firm also gave Carrigan services at cost.  Accord-
ing to the petition for writ of certiorari: 
Vasquez was Carrigan’s campaign manager at the time of the Lazy 8 vote; 
Vasquez and his company had provided services to Carrigan’s three campaigns at 
cost; Carrigan considered Vasquez’s assistance ‘instrumental’ to Carrigan’s three 
successful campaigns; and Carrigan, by his own admission, confided in Vasquez 
‘on matters where he would not confide in his own sibling. 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 6, Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. 2343 (No. 10-568), 2010 WL 
4278724, at *6.  The campaign manager had worked on and stood to benefit further fi-
nancially from the casino development, for which the council member favorably voted.  
Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. at 2347. 
 99. See, e.g., Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2826 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring) (using 
against the state the fact that it had operated in a certain way for years; suggesting that, if 
the state wanted to improve its laws nevertheless, it would have “to explain how circum-
stances have changed so dramatically in recent years” to justify the improvement); see also 
id. (“[T]he State fails to come to grips with the fact that public disclosure of referendum 
signatory information is a relatively recent practice in Washington. . . .  For nearly a centu-
ry, Washington's referendum process operated—and apparently operated successfully—
without the public disclosure of signatory information.  The State has failed to explain how 
circumstances have changed so dramatically in recent years that public disclosure is now 
required.”). 
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torical fetish or anecdote.100  At a minimum, these concerns suggest 
that, assuming contemporaneity can never be ignored or demoted in 
constitutional interpretation, the Court should give longevity (a.k.a. 
“tradition”) much less weight. 
B.  Convalescence: Judges as Trustees 
Although Carrigan’s historical reasoning rings problematic in 
both its methodology and its merit, Carrigan’s legacy might be else-
where.  That is, by taking a concept that had been applied primarily 
to legislators and applying it to judges, the Court may have sparked a 
new theory of recusal, or so I suggest.  Answering why legislative (and 
by slight extension, judicial) voting is not protected expression and 
therefore fully subject to recusal law, the Court reminded us that leg-
islators’ (and judges’) official acts are not their personal rights: 
 The answer is that a legislator’s vote is the commitment of 
his apportioned share of the legislature’s power to the pas-
sage or defeat of a particular proposal.  The legislative power 
thus committed is not personal to the legislator but belongs 
to the people; the legislator has no personal right to it.  As 
we said in Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 821 (1997), when 
denying Article III standing to legislators who claimed that 
their voting power had been diluted by a statute providing 
for a line-item veto, the legislator casts his vote “as trustee for 
his constituents, not as a prerogative of personal power.”  In 
 
 100. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579 (2003) (“As the Constitution en-
dures, persons in every generation can invoke its principles in their own search for greater 
freedom.”); GEOFFREY R. STONE & WILLIAM P. MARSHALL, ISSUE BRIEF: THE FRAMERS’ 
CONSTITUTION: TOWARD A THEORY OF PRINCIPLED CONSTITUTIONALISM (Am. Constitution 
Soc’y, 2011), http://www.acslaw.org/sites/default/files/Stone_Marshall_-
_The_Framers_Constitution_Issue_Brief.pdf (arguing that the Constitution sets forth 
broad principles, to which judges must give life and substance in an ever-changing socie-
ty); Erwin Chemerinsky, supra note 58, at 919 (observing that both tradition and the Su-
preme Court formerly banned women from practicing law and noting that “surely the his-
torical approval of such discrimination does not justify the practice today,” that “[s]ociety 
is constantly changing and its moral standards are perpetually evolving,” and that “[t]he 
Constitution must reflect these changes and this cannot be accomplished through a meth-
od of interpretation that is primarily based on Blackstone, English common law, and nine-
teenth century precedents”). 
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this respect, voting by a legislator is different from voting by 
a citizen.101 
The Court used only one clear criterion before applying the 
above analysis: whether voting “is a core legislative function.”102  With 
respect to judges, no one would dispute that judicial voting is indeed 
a “core [judicial] function.”  As with a legislator, moreover, a judge’s 
vote should not be personal, and like a litigant, no one should be the 
judge “in his own cause.”103  Furthermore, a judge’s personal interest 
in keeping a case ranges from illegitimate to insignificant,104 and thus 
the weight of the individual judge’s interest does not counterbalance 
the recusal scales.  It seems, then, that judges’ votes in a case are not 
their own (and are not protected by their First Amendment rights),105 
 
 101. Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. at 2350. 
 102. Id. at 2347 (quoting Carrigan v. Comm’n on Ethics, 236 P.3d 616, 621 (Nev. 
2010)). 
 103. “‘[N]o man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause; because his interest would 
certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity.’”  Caperton v. A.T. 
Massey Coal Co., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2259 (2009) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 59 
(James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)).  For recusal law, that is true in at least two 
ways: (1) various personal conflicts of interest often give the judge a personal (for exam-
ple, financial) interest in the case; and (2) even without such a personal interest, the deci-
sion is still “personal” in that the judge is asked to judge her own actions and propensities 
(and their appearances). 
 104. Indeed, the only detriment might be an illegitimate one: requiring recusal might 
remove the judge from a case in which the judge could make a name for herself.  See 
CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 34 (1924), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/cpr/pic/1924_canons.authch
eckdam.pdf (stating that a judge should not “administer the office for the purpose of ad-
vancing his personal ambitions or increasing his popularity”); see also Jeffrey W. Stempel, 
Chief William’s Ghost: The Problematic Persistence of the Duty to Sit, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 813, 814–15 
(2009) [hereinafter Stempel, Duty to Sit] (arguing that judges do not have a “duty to sit” in 
cases presenting valid grounds for recusal).  Although there is no tangible detriment to 
the judge who denies a disqualification motion and then is reversed, it is worth noting that 
judges do not like to be reversed.  Richard S. Higgins & Paul H. Rubin, Judicial Discretion, 9 
J. LEGAL STUD. 129, 130 (1980) (“For reasons not completely understood, judges seem to 
desire to avoid being reversed.”). 
 105. See Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. at 2349 & n.3 (suggesting that judicial recusal statutes do 
not violate the First Amendment and distinguishing White because it dealt with campaign-
trail conduct, not acts or omissions in office).  Indeed, after Carrigan, it may well take the 
recusal equivalent of White (that is, a case involving a judge’s failure to recuse, or disquali-
fication, for merely “announcing” a view on a “disputed legal or political issue”) before the 
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and that this fundamental point should guide the law and procedure 
of judicial recusal to the extent possible.106   
But whose votes are they?  The opinion identifies two potential 
owners: (1) “the people;” and (2) the “constituents.”107  These poten-
tial owners, however, do not seem well-suited to own judges’ votes.  
Judges swear to uphold the law, including the Constitution and the 
rule of law generally.  To the extent that the law is equivalent to “the 
people” in our constitutional republic, perhaps “the people” will suf-
fice, if not a perfect match.  To the extent that “the people” means 
the voters or “constituents,” we need to find new ownership. 
Because each litigant has a due process right to an impartial 
judge, and because a lasting beauty of the judiciary is its role in pro-
tecting minorities,108 the majority (and what is popular with the ma-
jority), or a random assortment of outspoken “constituents,” seem un-
fit to own the votes.109  The Codes of Judicial Conduct have long 
offered a better understanding: The judge should administer her of-
fice as a “public trust.”110  As a trustee, the judge does not own the 
 
First Amendment becomes a formidable question.  See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 
536 U.S. 765, 784 n.12 & 785 (2002) (striking down a Minnesota rule of judicial ethics bar-
ring judicial candidates from announcing their views on “disputed legal or political issues” 
because the rule failed to survive First Amendment strict scrutiny analysis); see also supra 
Part I.  
 106. This key point that the First Amendment does not limit the regulation of “legisla-
tive action”—and according to this Essay, judicial action—was also made in Reed.  Doe v. 
Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2833 n.3 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring) (distinguishing the first case 
in this trilogy, White, because it involved a prohibition against speaking on the campaign 
trail). 
 107. Somewhat analogously, Professor Sarah Cravens identified the common law as 
“(metaphorically) the property of the public,” and the public has in turn “entrusted the 
care and maintenance of the corpus of the common law to the judiciary.”  Sarah M.R. Cra-
vens, Judges as Trustees: A Duty to Account and an Opportunity for Virtue, 62 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 1637, 1639 (2005).  “As trustees of the law,” she argued further, “judges have an obli-
gation to uphold and maintain the corpus in individual cases in accordance with the un-
derlying aims of the corpus.”  Id. at 1639–40. 
 108. See, e.g., Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 828–29 (1997) (noting that the value of judi-
cial review stems from the protection it affords to individuals and minority groups); see also 
supra note 80. 
 109. If, again, we can safely substitute “the people” for the law, or arguably even justice, 
this new conceptualization might lead to a better understanding of recusal law. 
 110. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Pmbl. (2004) (“Intrinsic to all sections of this 
Code are the precepts that judges, individually and collectively, must respect and honor 
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corpus.111  Without even identifying the precise owner of judicial 
votes—whether past, present, or future litigants, the political subdivi-
sion, the people, or justice—we can determine that judges neither own 
their votes nor have rights to cast conflicted votes.112   
For whatever reason, many judges are lax in recusing themselves, 
and many other judges are lax in later disqualifying those judges who 
failed to recuse themselves.113  Perhaps explaining ownership—and 
emphasizing that judges clearly do not own votes—might resonate 
better with judges, and the concept takes one more step toward mak-
 
the judicial office as a public trust and strive to enhance and maintain confidence in our 
legal system.”) (emphasis added); MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Pmbl. (2007) (sub-
stantially the same); cf. James J. Sample, Lawyer, Candidate, Beneficiary, AND Judge? Role Dif-
ferentiation in Elected Judiciaries, 51 JUDGES’ J. 30, 33–34 (2012) (referring astutely to judges 
as “fiduciaries of the rule of law”). 
 111. Of course, trustees are indeed authorized to make decisions affecting the corpus, 
but that bare fact misses the conceptual point (and ignores conflicts rules).  Trustees’ per-
sonal interests, moreover, are not a legitimate factor in those decisions. 
 112. Cf. Menachem Mautner, Moral And Legal Luck: Luck in the Courts, 9 THEORETICAL 
INQUIRIES L. 217, 231 (2008) (noting that “the duty incumbent on judges to abide by the 
norm of impartiality might be viewed as an expression of the approach that sees the judge 
as a trustee of the litigating parties”).  Judges, under this conception, must not be distract-
ed from this trusteeship by other influences, including “personal” ones.  Id.  Arguably, 
then, their personal interests would include (among others) (1) their interest in assessing 
their own impartiality, or the appearance of it, and (2) any personal interest in keeping 
the case, despite a pending motion to disqualify or ground for recusal.  Judges whose im-
partiality is in question are not the proper judges to decide that question. 
 113. See, e.g., Keith Swisher, Pro-Prosecution Judges, supra note 31, at 370–72 (discussing 
some of the various studies and reasons showing that judges are not accurate judges of 
their own disqualification questions).  In addition to the studies and reasons listed in the 
previously cited work, one vivid example can be found in United States v. Holland, holding 
that the trial judge permissibly presided over the sentencing of a defendant who had 
called the judge’s home and threatened him.  519 F.3d 909, 916 (9th Cir. 2008).  The 
court was apparently worried about judge shopping through defendants’ hollow threats.  
Id. at 915.  Yet the court missed several points: (1) that the judge would likely be at least 
angry that the defendant called the judge’s house making improper remarks (even if the 
judge was not scared about threats); (2) that each time a defendant threatens a public of-
ficial, he commits a serious felony, the fear of which would deter most defendants from 
making hollow threats merely to judge shop; and (3) the defendant had not previously 
threatened this or another federal judge (and thus disqualifying the trial judge would not 
necessarily lead to more threats and more disqualifications). 
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ing the matter less personal to them.114  Moreover, although recusal 
law has historically been plagued (and mocked) because the same 
judge whose impartiality is being questioned also decides whether her 
impartiality could be questioned, this new conception might beckon 
an end to this legal joke.  Under the conception, as a non-owner, the 
affected judge simply does not have standing to challenge a disquali-
fication motion.115  This cleansing perhaps could even be extended to 
other instances in which individual judges are named in and potential-
ly defend actions in their “official” capacity;116 this often erroneous 
conflation of the individual and the official should stop.  Similarly, in 
drafting and enforcing recusal law, drafters and regulators might be 
better guided and energized now that they have a clearer picture of 
the rightful “owner”—or at least the “non-owner.”  
Finally, this clarified conception exposes the lurking error in 
Kennedy’s concurrence, which implied strong “associational rights” 
for elective officials to bond with campaign supporters and rule on 
 
 114. Indeed, one of the advantages of an appearance-based disqualification standard is 
that it does not require the judge, or the judges’ colleagues, to declare that the judge is 
actually biased—something that they would be reluctant to do—only that the circumstanc-
es create an untoward appearance.  
 115. Judges have no individual stake in—and suffer no cognizable harm from the loss 
of—their votes.  Cf., e.g., Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 829 (1997) (concluding the same for 
legislators’ votes); Stempel, Duty to Sit, supra note 104, at 814–15 (concluding that judges 
have no duty to sit).  Any “claim of standing is based on a loss of political power, not loss of 
any private right.”  Raines, 521 U.S. at 821.  “The claimed injury thus runs (in a sense) with 
the Member’s seat, a seat which the Member holds (it may quite arguably be said) as trus-
tee for his constituents, not as a prerogative of personal power.”  Id.  Thus, judges individ-
ually bring with them no interest to counterbalance the movant’s interest in disqualifica-
tion.  The focus then should shift to any interest they hold in their trustee capacity (for 
example, the fair administration of justice).  In light of their personally questioned impar-
tiality, however, these judges are not the best trustees to identify and effectuate the trust’s 
best interests; other judges should instead decide whether disqualification is appropriate. 
 116. See, e.g., Gowan v. Keller, No. 11-50874, at 3 (5th Cir. filed May 30, 2012), 
http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions%5Cunpub%5C11/11-50874.0.wpd.pdf (construing 
a complaint against Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Justice Sharon Keller as a mandamus 
action); Derendal v. Griffith, 104 P.3d 147, 149 (Ariz. 2005) (appealing Phoenix Municipal 
Judge Griffith’s ruling); Costa v. Mackey, 261 P.3d 449, 455 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2011) (defend-
ing the trial judge’s decision, including a decision refusing to disqualify the previous trial 
judge). 
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“common cause[s].”117  Our public officials (or a minimum the subset 
of judges) may well have personal “associational” rights, but they 
should have no right to import those “associational rights” into the 
duties of public office.  The public office stands pure in its public 
purpose—from which no judge’s personal needs or wants should de-
tract.  Indeed, a judge whose “associational rights” might affect the 
proceeding in any significant way should not attempt to remain in the 
case; to the contrary, the judge should step aside so that another 
judge without individual baggage can better discharge the public 
purpose.  A judge who instead rationalizes or appeals to stay in the 
case necessarily seeks to commingle the public purpose with personal 
purpose.   
In sum, the conceptual shift is incremental, and it will not answer 
all questions.  But it is fundamental: Judges administering the public 
office as trustees have no recognized personal interest—and no stand-
ing to attempt to assert personal interest. 
V.  CODA 
The Carrigan and Caperton Courts wisely (if somewhat inadvert-
ently) closed the opening in White, which had constitutionally jeop-
ardized and practically deterred recusal law.118  After nearly a decade 
of living in significant fear and under considerable uncertainty, judi-
cial ethics regulators in the post-Carrigan world should finally be able 
 
 117. Justice Kennedy was worried about the “burdens [that recusal laws might] impose 
on the First Amendment speech rights of legislators and constituents apart from an assert-
ed right to engage in the act of casting a vote.”  Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. at 2352 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring).  In particular, he thought even close friendships and other associations, in-
cluding campaign supporters, should not necessarily disqualify legislators from their 
“common cause[s] now at stake.”  Id. at 2353.  To be sure, Kennedy himself arguably ex-
cluded judges from this analysis.  See id. (noting that the role of legislative bodies might 
not apply to “principles of judicial impartiality” and the “role of courts in adjudicating in-
dividual disputes”).  But to speak generally about First Amendment rights of judges “apart 
from” their vote is a faulty premise.  Judges—as members of the judiciary—should have no 
such rights.  On the campaign trail and off the bench, for instance, individual candidates 
and incumbents have measured First Amendment rights.  See supra Part I and accompany-
ing notes.  Carrigan, however, helped to show that the First Amendment no longer applies 
on the bench.  See supra Part III.  Of course, judicial speech necessary to carry out the pub-
lic office cannot and should not be silenced, but that has nothing to do with the underly-
ing personal rights of the individual judge. 
 118. See supra Parts I–III. 
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to enforce recusal rules to their intended extent.  To be sure, a few 
dangerous First Amendment openings still exist, including whether 
(and if so, which particular) recusal rules violate the associational 
rights of elective judges.119  Moreover, the Court’s use of history is 
dangerous in general and doubly dangerous for ethics in particular.120  
Although history can contain useful observations for both judicial and 
moral interpretations, the Court has created a constitutional “stop 
loss” policy by which outdated practices are continually forced to 
maintain active duty; notwithstanding the drastically changed circum-
stances, these tired practices now constitute and constrain our consti-
tutional order.121 
But Carrigan and Caperton have also created other promising new 
openings—including the conceptual act of removing voting power 
from the list of judges’ personal rights—which present possibilities to 




 119. See Nev. Comm’n on Ethics v. Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. 2343, 2353–54 (2011) (Kennedy, 
J., concurring) (implying strong associational rights for elective officials to bond with 
campaign supporters and rule on “common cause[s]”).  The Court also did not address 
the vagueness or overbreadth challenges, but presumably between the strongly supportive 
language of the Court’s opinion and Justice Kennedy’s distinction between the judicial 
and legislative contexts, there is little to fear.  See id. at 2353 (distinguishing between judi-
cial and legislative situations). 
 120. See supra Part IV.A. 
 121. See supra Part IV.A. 
 122. See supra Part IV.B. 
